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ABSTRACT
In April 2019, a so-called ‘dissident’ republican New IRA gun-man killed journal-
ist Lyra McKee, whilst firing at police during a riot in Derry in the North of 
Ireland. The New and Continuity IRAs remain wedded to an armed campaign for 
Irish sovereignty, drawing legitimacy from partition and the ongoing British 
‘presence’ in Northern Ireland – and rejecting the significance of altered condi-
tions within the state. Conversely, independent ‘dissident’ republicans, formerly 
in the Provisional IRA, criticise the ongoing campaign by the groups as futile. 
This article examines key areas of debate within the ‘dissident’/radical repub-
lican base, on armed actions at present – drawing on unpublished qualitative 
interviews with independents, the RSF Movement, and Saoradh,– the organisa-
tion believed to be the political wing of the New IRA. This article assesses the 
nature of the campaign waged by the Continuity and New IRAs and examines 
whether it represents a continuation of the Provisional IRA campaign, or a new 
departure.
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Lenin the old Bolshevik used to say never play with armed insurrection. You can’t 
afford to play with it because it’s too serious, it’s too crucial. It’s too dangerous to 
play with armed insurrection because if you’re not able to deliver, or if you don’t 
have a reasonable prospect of delivering, then you’re playing with it. 
-Tommy McKearney, Interview with the author, Monaghan 
First and foremost [our aim] is to destabilise. But the aim of the Movement would 
be to rebuild. We’ve been in situations where there’s been sporadic attacks; and 
the same things that was levelled against the volunteers back then- you know 
asking is it worth it? Is it going to achieve anything? And the Movement has come 
out and shown that it can rebuild and it can come out as a fighting force. 
-RSF Movement, Interview with the author, North Armagh
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Introduction
On 18 April 2019, a New IRA gun-man killed 29 year-old journalist Lyra McKee 
in Derry, when firing at the PSNI1 during a riot. The New IRA sent a statement 
to the Irish News which read ‘In the course of attacking the enemy Lyra McKee 
was tragically killed while standing beside enemy forces. The IRA offer our full 
and sincere apologies to the partner, family and friends of Lyra McKee for her 
death’.2 Lyra McKee’s killing provoked widespread condemnation locally and 
internationally, as well as across the political spectrum within the North of 
Ireland. Notably, condemnation also came from within the so-called ‘dissi-
dent’ republican base, including from Gary Donnelly, a former spokesperson 
for the 32-County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM)3 who is now an indepen-
dent Councillor in Derry, having topped the poll in May 2019.4 Commenting 
on the killing, Donnelly said ‘an innocent woman is dead because of a reckless 
act . . . I would plead with those behind this attack to desist from any further 
attacks and seriously consider the consequences of their actions’.5
The New IRA is the most recently formed (and believed to be the most 
active) armed ‘dissident’ republican group who are continuing with their 
campaign for Irish sovereignty. The other active armed group (and the oldest) 
within the ‘dissident’ base is the Continuity IRA (CIRA). It is widely believed 
that Saoradh is the political wing of the New IRA and Republican Sinn Féin 
(RSF) is the political wing of the Continuity IRA, although the organisations 
deny this. ‘Dissident’ (or radical) republicanism refers collectively to repub-
lican organisations and individuals who are critical of Sinn Féin and the 
Provisional Movement, and of the political process in which they are 
engaged; and many so-called ‘dissidents’ are former members of Sinn Féin 
or the Provisional IRA (PIRA).
‘Dissident’ breakaway groups, from the Provisional Movement (or Sinn 
Féin), represent the latest divisions in Irish republicanism. Since the 1920s 
republicanism has endured several major splits, leading Brendan Behan to 
famously quip that for republican organisations the first item on the agenda 
is the split. The 1969 split resulted in the formation of the Provisional IRA, 
which broke away from the Official IRA. Between the 1920s and 1986 major 
splits occurred over recognition of the southern state (which resulted from 
partition), as well as the use of armed struggle.6 Post ‘86 splits from the 
Provisional Movement, resulting in the so-called ‘dissident’ organisations, 
occurred over issues such as acceptance of the consent principle a central 
tenet of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement or legitimacy of the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland. Support for ‘dissident’ groups has been marginal com-
pared to the majority of nationalist/republican support commanded by Sinn 
Féin.
Gary Donnelly’s comments on McKee’s killing are reflective of the fact that 
the ‘dissident’/radical republican base contains a spectrum of opinion.7 The 
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‘dissident’ base does not contain any central organisation or structure, but 
rather exists in the form of a number of organisations and individuals (inde-
pendents). Contrary to mainstream portrayal of the ‘dissident’ base as synon-
ymous with violence, it comprises a spectrum of opinion on current armed 
actions, from unequivocal support to condemnation. The level of fragmenta-
tion within ‘dissident’ republicanism, and the number of organisations, is 
reflective of the various points at which different groups broke away from 
Sinn Féin or the Provisional Movement and formed another organisation.8 
Within the ‘dissident’ constituency, attitudes to current armed actions exist 
broadly within two camps.
The first camp expresses outright support for current armed actions, 
emphasising the fact that political and socio-economic contexts do not 
impact the campaign for Irish sovereignty. It argues that altered structural 
conditions within Northern Ireland do not impact the legitimacy of the 
campaign; it then concludes that no distinction should be made between 
the legitimacy of the PIRA campaign and that of the New and Continuity IRAs. 
Public support does not signify in relation to the campaign, as previous 
generations did not have mass support for their campaigns and were no 
less legitimate. The first camp argues that the Provisional IRA leadership 
failed, not the methods, and it maintains a fidelity to the right to engage in 
armed actions to attain the sovereignty of Ireland, as expressed in the 1916 
Proclamation. This position is mainly occupied by Republican Sinn Féin, the 
32CSM and Saoradh.
The second camp argues that the PIRA campaign was justified, but the 
campaigns waged by the armed groups today are not justified due to altered 
structural and socio-economic conditions within Northern Ireland. It stresses 
the need for public support and points to a lack of support for a current 
campaign; without public support, the camp argues, the campaign has no 
chance of succeeding, and lacks any moral basis. Republicans may have 
a right to engage in armed activity, but tactical decisions must be made 
regarding when that right should be exercised. This position is mainly occu-
pied by independent republicans who are former members of the PIRA and 
who argue that it was right to end the PIRA campaign. They remain critical of 
the direction in which Sinn Féin has moved, simultaneously condemning the 
campaign of the Continuity and New IRAs.
Widespread condemnation (in the mainstream) of republican armed 
actions is unlikely to impact the armed groups; however, more notice may 
be taken of criticism from within the so-called ‘dissident’ base. This article will 
examine whether the killing of Lyra McKee marked a defining moment within 
‘dissident’ republicanism and will provide an assessment of divergent atti-
tudes within that constituency towards a current campaign. There is not 
a readily available archive of IRA material on which to draw; as illustrated 
by Bowyer Bell who, when writing about the IRA in 1990, stated that ‘the 
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problem for the inquisitive is that a secret army in the midst of an armed 
campaign prefers to remain secret. Thus, even more than in the years before 
the present troubles, the only reliable sources are people . . . there appears to 
be no other approach to a secretive army’.9 In this context, qualitative inter-
views prove an invaluable source in providing insight into the ideology and 
strategy of those involved, – from which we can draw causal explanations. 
Key studies on republicanism, to date, have made valuable use of interviews, 
including Richard English’s Armed Struggle, J. Bowyer Bell’s The Secret Army: 
The IRA 1916–1979, Robert W. White’s Out of the Ashes: An oral history of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Movement, Ed Moloney’s A Secret History of the IRA, 
Ruán O’Donnell’s Special Category: The IRA in English prisons (volumes 1 and 2) 
and Brendan O’Brien’s The Long War: The IRA & Sinn Féin.
Based on a similar premise, this article draws on previously unpublished in- 
depth qualitative interviews conducted by the author in October 2020 with 
key players in ‘dissident’/radical republicanism, including independents 
Anthony McIntyre and Tommy McKearney10 who are former members of 
the PIRA; a spokesperson for the wider RSF Movement in North Armagh 
who is a former CIRA prisoner11; and Damien (Dee) Fennell, who is a former 
prisoner in Maghaberry,12 and a founder member of Saoradh (formed 2016) 
and Ard Chomhairle member (ruling Executive) 2016–2021.13 Saoradh is 
believed to be the political wing of the New IRA. However, they strongly 
deny this. Fennell’s interview is the first time that a member of the Saoradh 
leadership has discussed in-depth the killing of Lyra McKee and its aftermath, 
providing unprecedented insight into the organisation’s views on the killing 
and its impact on Saoradh.
The killing of Lyra McKee shone a spotlight back onto the campaign of the 
Continuity and New IRAs and provided for a reassessment of continuing 
armed actions. The qualitative interviews contained in this article provide 
an in-depth examination of the key areas of debate within that base, between 
those who advocate continued armed struggle and those who oppose it. 
Essentially, this article examines why Lyra McKee was tragically (though 
unintentionally) killed on 18 April 2019, and the opposing views, on armed 
struggle, within the base in its aftermath.
‘Dissident’ actions in an altered landscape
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement was seen as heralding a new era in the 
politics of Northern Ireland, relegating large-scale violent conflict to the past. 
In 1997, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) declared a permanent cessation of activ-
ities. Then, in 2005, it decommissioned its weapons signalling that any tactical 
return to armed struggle was no longer considered an option. On the 
28 July 2005 a statement from ‘the leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann’14 
formally ordered an end to the armed campaign, stating that all IRA units 
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had been ordered to dump arms. The statement, signed P. O’Neill read ‘all 
Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political 
and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means’.15 The 
message was clear; the Provisional IRA’s war was over and efforts would be 
directed into the peace process and the political strategy of Sinn Féin. Sinn 
Féin spokespersons have emphasised that, if there was another way forward, 
they would take it; for them the Good Friday Agreement, and consent 
principle contained within it, presented a viable alternative through which 
they could pursue their political aims.
The PIRA statement also read ‘We reiterate our view that the armed 
struggle was entirely legitimate’.16 Whilst the Provisional leadership contin-
ued to assert the legitimacy of the Provisional campaign, in equal measure it 
denounced as illegitimate, the campaign waged by so-called ‘dissident’ 
groups, with Sinn Féin spokespersons often calling on those organisations 
to vacate the stage. Sinn Féin has labelled ‘dissident’ armed activity as attacks 
on the peace process and has argued that those responsible have nothing to 
offer the community. For the Provisional Movement, altered conditions 
within the Northern Ireland state has removed the justification for an 
armed campaign. In response, ‘dissident’ groups have criticised Sinn Féin as 
abandoning the traditional republican position and have dubbed them con-
stitutional nationalists.
Against a backdrop of PIRA decommissioning, armed actions persisted from 
the Continuity IRA (CIRA), formed in 1986, as its political wing Republican Sinn 
Féin (RSF) carried CIRA messages and statements online and in their monthly 
newspaper Saoirse. Armed activity also continued from Óglaigh na hÉireann 
(ONH),17 formed in 2009, who were seen as sharing a position with Republican 
Network for Unity (RNU).18 The Real IRA (RIRA), formed in 1997, also continued 
with their campaign as their message was carried by their political counterpart 
the 32-County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM),19 though the organisation has 
remained relatively inactive since 2010. This is partly a consequence of the fact 
that in 2012 a significant portion of the RIRA merged with Republican action 
against drugs (RAAD) and independent republicans to form the New IRA, 
which simply refers to itself as ‘the IRA’.
In contrast to the intense campaign waged by the Provisional IRA, the 
campaign fought by armed ‘dissident’ groups has been low-level and spora-
dic in nature with occasional attacks aimed predominantly at police and the 
prison service. As noted by Whiting, incidents such as the killing of police and 
prison staff, and the Omagh bombing in 1998 which killed 29 people, are 
exceptions within the overall pattern of low-level activity.20 Please see Table 1 
for a brief timeline of some key armed activity from ‘dissident’ groups 
between 1998 and 2016 which resulted in fatalities or serious injury.
Other activities during this period, and since, include punishment beatings 
and shootings directed at drug-dealers, mortar bombs, petrol bombs, letter 
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bombs, and the use of hoax devices to lure the PSNI to a scene where an 
attack is then launched. As demonstrated in Table 1, attacks may be low-level 
and occasional, but they are consistently potentially fatal. Consequently, the 
official threat level for ‘Northern Ireland-related terrorism’ has remained 
severe since 2009 meaning that an attack is highly likely. PSNI security 
situation statistics show that between 1 April 2019 and the 31 March 2020 
there were 21 bombing incidents, 40 shooting incidents, 30 firearms seized 
and 774 rounds of ammunition found.21 Geographical pockets of ‘dissident’ 
armed activity exist in Belfast, Derry, Tyrone, Fermanagh and North Armagh. 
Whilst armed attacks from ‘dissident’ groups predominantly take place in the 
North of Ireland, membership also exists in the South. Planning, organisa-
tional, and training activities have taken place in the South as evidenced by 
the number of prisoners in Portlaiose prison, which is approximately 26. 
Overall, there are approximately 60 republican prisoners in prisons in 
Ireland, the majority of whom are affiliated with Saoradh or the New IRA, 
the organisation which has been deemed the most active and capable.22
Continuation of struggle or something new?
The killing of McKee brought into sharp focus the strongly opposing views 
that already existed within the ‘dissident’ base on armed actions at present. 
Independent republicans such as Anthony McIntyre and Tommy McKearney 
have openly criticised the armed campaigns waged by the groups and have 
previously articulated their views on The Pensive Quill, Socialist Voice, the 
Blanket and Fourthwrite amongst other platforms.’23 A majority of indepen-
dents are former members of Sinn Féin or the PIRA and their attitudes to 
current armed actions are influenced by their views on the origins and ending 
of the PIRA campaign.24
Collectively, ‘dissident’ republicans generally agree on the right to armed 
action, but they disagree on when that right should be exercised. It is unlikely 
that moral arguments, made against armed actions, such as those articulated 
by mainstream political actors, will have any resonance with ‘dissident’ 
groups. But the views of McIntyre and McKearney provide a valuable analysis, 
from within the ‘dissident’ family, of why armed actions should stop. As 
individuals who fought in the Provisional IRA campaign, their arguments 
are grounded in factors beyond the ethics or morality of armed struggle. By 
juxtaposing the opposing positions within ‘dissident’ republicanism on 
a current armed campaign, this article provides an insight into the ongoing 
key areas of debate in that base.
McIntyre and McKearney have argued that the PIRA campaign was justi-
fied but that the campaign waged by the Continuity and New IRAs is not 
justified due to changed conditions in the North of Ireland. Similar to the Sinn 
Fein position, independent republicans have argued that changed structural 
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conditions within the Northern Ireland state, including the end of discrimina-
tion against Catholics in housing and jobs, removed the moral justification for 
an armed campaign. Conversely, RSF and Saoradh have argued that the IRA 
campaign was fought for Irish sovereignty (and nothing less) and therefore 
altered structural conditions within Northern Ireland do not affect traditional 
republican ideology. In fact, the ‘dissident’/radical republican narrative argues 
that it was Sinn Féin’s constitutionalism that delivered ‘civil rights’ rather than 
sovereignty; an argument neatly summed up in the often-quoted speech by 
Bobby Sand’s sister Bernadette Sands-McKevitt25 when she stated that 
‘Bobby did not die for cross-border bodies with executive powers. He did 
not die for nationalists to be equal British citizens within the Northern Ireland 
state’.26
Tonge has argued that (in 1998) ‘What had been seen as an unacceptable 
“unionist veto” by different strands of republicanism was now accepted as 
a legitimate requirement for unionist consent for unity. The history of the 
Provisional IRA’s “war” was rewritten somewhat, as one waged against an 
orange state (a war arguably won in 1972) and designed to achieve equality 
for Northern nationalists (structural imbalances had largely disappeared by 
the end of the 1990s)’.27 The removal of the discriminatory regime in 
March 1972 was a victory; but it did not fulfil the ultimate objective of the 
PIRA of Irish sovereignty, – an argument advanced by Tonge. Rather, it was 
a stepping stone on the way to Irish unity. ‘Dissident’ republicans have 
continued to argue that the war was fought for sovereignty and nothing 
less; and those advocating its continuance do so on the basis that sovereignty 
has not yet been achieved.28
Within the radical republican base contested narratives exist on whether 
current armed actions can be located as the latest phase in the one long 
campaign; or more specifically as a continuation of the campaign waged by 
the PIRA. Tonge has argued ‘despite claims to the contrary from “mainstream” 
republicans, the so-called “dissidents” do represent historical continuity, 
a strand of irreconcilable republicanism impervious to hostility or 
isolation’.29 The New IRA styles itself simply the IRA, pointedly rejecting 
implications that it is something new. Similarly, the CIRA has emphasised 
the continuity of the one long campaign. The Continuity and New IRAs view 
the current period as simply a lull in republican activity similar to previous 
periods of low-level IRA activity, as demonstrated by an RSF spokesperson in 
North Armagh:
From a republican perspective we have to acknowledge that there is no large- 
scale campaign at the moment. But for the Republican Movement, we’ve been 
here before. We would contrast this with the 40s and 50s where there wasn’t 
a large-scale campaign. We are coming on the back of the treachery that was 
inflicted upon the Movement and it’s the job of republicans now to rebuild that 
Movement’.30
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As Frampton argues ‘there is a part of the collective republican psyche which 
holds that, regardless of circumstance or present adversity, the movement 
will always return and, ultimately triumph’.31 Whilst the CIRA was not 
involved in the killing of Lyra McKee, when asked about it, a spokesperson 
for the RSF Movement commented:
From the Movement’s point of view we would always say that armed action is 
legitimate, provided that it is controlled and disciplined. So yes we all have to 
acknowledge that the killing of Lyra McKee was damaging for the Movement 
the same way the La Mon bombing in Belfast was damaging for the Movement, 
Enniskillen was damaging for the Movement; and we have to take stock of 
where we’re at and to again caution those that, whether it be publicly or not, 
are willing to engage in armed actions- that they have a moral responsibility as 
well to ensure that any armed action is controlled and disciplined.32
The location of McKee’s tragic killing within the spectrum of incidents under-
taken by the PIRA, such as the Enniskillen bombing in 198733 or the La Mon 
bombing in 1978,34 further demonstrates the CIRA’s conceptualisation that 
current armed actions are a continuation of the one long republican cam-
paign. There is a deliberate reference to La Mon and Enniskillen in an attempt 
to point out that the PIRA also undertook armed actions that unintentionally 
resulted in the loss of civilian life, what has been referred to by republicans as 
unintended casualties of war.
Independent republicans such as McIntyre and McKearney have rejected 
the groups’ assertions that they are the latest phase of one long republican 
campaign. Rather, they have emphasised that the PIRA campaign, in which 
they took part, arose from a specific set of circumstances within the state of 
Northern Ireland (whilst drawing on republican tradition).35 For McIntyre and 
McKearney conditions within the state were key to the formation of the 
Provisional Movement. Both have cited the attacks on Bombay Street in 
1969, the raids for IRA weapons on the Falls Road in 1970, the Falls Curfew 
in 1970, internment in 1971 and Bloody Sunday in January 1972 as key events 
in the creation of the PIRA,36 with McIntyre stating that ‘Once we’d Bloody 
Sunday the die was cast . . . So they were key events in shaping the Provos 
which don’t exist today . . . I think that the Provos were time specific but drew 
on republican tradition’.37 Similarly, Bean has suggested that ‘Provisionalism 
was not a mere reproduction of tradition. Its military and political practice 
reflected the harsher urban tones and contemporary experiences of the ‘war 
zone”.38 When asked if the New IRA’s campaign is the same as the PIRA’s 
McIntyre commented:
No they are not the same campaign as the Provisionals. The Provisionals, you 
can argue, were a powerful social protest movement. The real conditions for the 
insurrection, the energy that went into the Provisional’s, had nothing to do with 
the border; it had to do with the conditions in the North and the way that the 
nationalist community and Catholics were treated in the North. The Provos 
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represented an insurrectional energy that doesn’t exist. The Provos were not 
a political cult. They were a political movement. 39
McIntyre argues that the Provisionals were a product of the circumstances in 
which they were born, – as defenders of Catholic areas against communal 
violence. He refers to them as a social protest movement due to that wider 
context and energy. McIntyre argues that, in contrast, ‘dissident’ armed 
groups do not possess the same insurrectionary energy; nor do they reflect 
social trends in society, in a way that the Provisionals did. Rather, he has 
criticised them as removed from wider political realities and has argued that 
they are simply repeating old republican mantras, – hence like political cults.
Regarding the prevailing narrative ‘that the Provisionals arose like the 
Phoenix “Out of the ashes”’, White has cautioned that ‘Certainly young people 
flocked to the IRA after August 1969, and many of them ended up in the 
Provisionals. But teenagers in Belfast, defending their neighbourhoods, did 
not create the Provisional IRA or the Sinn Féin Caretaker Executive.’40 White 
quotes Gerard Magee, a pre ’69 IRA volunteer, who in Tyrone Struggle said ‘I 
didn’t need to be struck over the head by an RUC baton to become an active 
republican’.41 Like Magee, other founders of the PIRA, such as Billy McKee in 
Belfast were active in the IRA prior to 1969. ‘Dissident’ republicans who were 
involved in the PIRA campaign have almost universally argued that their 
driving force was Irish sovereignty.42 The raison d’etre of the PIRA campaign, 
which emerged in 1969, remains an area of contestation and impacts views 
on a campaign at present. As English aptly stated ‘the most persuasive 
analysis of the IRA will concentrate less on whether their war was justified 
than in careful explanation of why it happened’.43
There is some symmetry between the position of independents and Sinn 
Féin regarding the PIRA’s raison d’etre. It is, therefore, unsurprising that 
many independents within the radical republican base were supportive of 
the PIRA ceasefires in the 1990s, including Anthony McIntyre, Gerard 
Hodgins, Richard O’Rawe, and Tommy McKearney who has stated ‘The IRA 
ceasefire came at a time when I thought it was the rational option to take; 
that little could be achieved by continuing with armed campaign at that 
stage’.44 Independents have argued that it is perfectly compatible to be 
supportive of the PIRA ceasefires whilst being critical of Sinn Féin. 
McKearney has explained ‘By the beginning of the ‘80s I had noticed that 
the Sinn Fein party was starting to use the term nationalist to appeal to the 
nationalist population which I found worrying and concerning because it 
brings us back into an older position of Redmondism, nationalism or ethnic 
identity as distinct from the common identity of citizenship’.45 He continued 
that Sinn Féin was ‘determined to pursue parliamentary policy’ and refer-
enced Sinn Féin’s decision to end its policy of abstentionism, stating ‘I 
believed that it was going to end up in a helpless hopeless reformist 
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position and I left the Provisional IRA at that stage and that was the reason. 
I have little reason to change my mind since’.46
Anthony McIntyre was also supportive of the PIRA ceasefire stating that he 
came to the conclusion that ‘it can’t continue because we are not capable of 
changing any more’.47 His criticism of the Provisional Movement is directed at the 
message they have put out since, stating ‘let’s not pretend that we are substitut-
ing one strategy for a better one. We are not. We are giving up and I said I don’t 
mind us having to surrender. Patrick Pearse surrendered. But let’s see what the 
terms of surrender are. There’s no united Ireland on this agenda. Sure it’s all ring 
fenced in by the consent principle. That’s what’s being discussed’.48 For many 
across the radical republican base their opposition to the principle of consent49 is 
more fundamental than the PIRA ceasefires. McIntyre continued:
The Good Friday Agreement marked the failure of the Provisional IRA campaign. 
So I mean they didn’t achieve anything that they fought for and they got all the 
things that they fought against so in a sense the way it turned out it would have 
made more sense being the military wing of the SDLP because the SDLP’s 
objectives were all achieved.50
The reasons behind McIntyre and McKearney’s support for the PIRA ceasefires 
in the 1990s give some insight into why they reject armed actions by the 
Continuity and New IRAs at present. They argue that changed structural 
conditions within Northern Ireland removed justification for continuing 
with armed actions; and point to the fact that justification for the PIRA’s 
campaign, which started in 1969, was underpinned by the conditions in 
which it emerged.
Republicanism has traditionally encompassed a broad church of varying 
positions on the pillars of socialism and nationalism, as well as a spectrum of 
opinion on armed struggle. It is therefore unsurprising that in the contemporary 
period, what is known as ‘dissident’ republicanism, is a highly fractured base. The 
way in which the word ‘dissident’ is commonly used in the mainstream, has 
resulted in some from within that base challenging the word, asserting that 1) 
republicans have always been dissidents by nature, 2) they have not changed 
their position and 3) many were active in republicanism prior to the formation of 
the Provisional Movement in 1969. The Honorary President of the 32CSM Phil 
O’Donoghue in Kilkenny was active on the Brookeborough raid with Sean South 
in 1957,51 Billy McKee of Belfast was imprisoned for his republican activity in 
every decade between the 1930s and 1970s and Ricard Behal in Killarney was 
active in the Republican Movement from around 1956. Peig King who was the 
patron of RSF, from 2015 until her death in 2019, first marched in Cumann na 
mBan52 uniform in 1947. Significantly, not only has the word dissident been 
contested, but debate has developed within radical republicanism around the 
very definition of republicanism and the place that armed struggle occupies 
within that.
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In the mainstream, the word dissident has become synonymous with the 
armed groups leading Tommy McKearney to argue:
The use of force is very much a political option but if republicanism is equated 
just simply with the use of force then it makes it a fetish. It’s not a philosophy, 
it’s a fetish and this is what has brought down those breakaway groups from the 
Provisional IRA because they have defined republicanism purely through the 
use of force. They have not looked beyond the use of force. So instead of 
a philosophy what they have is a fetish which has rewarded them richly with no 
support and massive infiltration.53
McKearney continued ‘This thing that there is such a thing as physical force 
republicanism. It doesn’t make sense. Republicanism is about establishing 
a Republic and then the question becomes how do we define the Republic 
that we want and that’s why I say that I’m in support of a Worker’s Republic 
and then let’s talk about that’.54 Unlike many others within the radical 
republican base, McKearney includes Sinn Féin and Fianna Fáil within the 
republican spectrum and has stated about Sinn Fein ‘If they’re not monar-
chists then they’re republican but I’ll be attempting to establish the Republic 
that I want and they are not. That’s where I draw the line. Is their Republic my 
Republic? and I’m saying it’s not’.55
Mandate and popular support
The contemporary Sinn Féin message emphasises its electoral support and 
mandate, both North and South, and a dominant criticism levelled at so- 
called ‘dissident’ groups is that they do not possess a mandate; and therefore, 
nor does the associated armed campaign. With the exception of RSF 
Councillor Tomás Ó Curraoin in Galway, RSF, the 32CSM nor Saoradh possess 
an electoral mandate; however, nor do they seek one. For many radical 
republicans the dreaded road to constitutional nationalism and ‘sell out’ is 
paved with tactical decisions, particularly in relation to elections. The base is 
ever vigilant of tactical changes which compromise traditional republican 
ideology. Historically, Irish republicanism has not taken its legitimacy from 
the electoral process and the ‘dissident’/radical republican narrative has 
pointed to previous generations and asked where was the electoral mandate 
for 1916, Tom Williams in the 1940s or the 1956–62 border campaign?56 
A distinction is drawn between electoral support and legitimacy and radical 
republicans reject conflation of the two by the mainstream. As stated by 
Tonge ‘For those whose ‘war’ has still not ended, the supposed ‘mandate’ 
comes from the necessity of resistance to ‘foreign occupation’ and from 
history, via the supposed popular will of the Irish people when last expressed 
as a single unit in 1918ʹ.57
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RSF do not contest local elections in the North due to the test oath, 
a declaration against terrorism.58 In section 4.5 of the Saoradh constitution, 
the following objective is stated: ‘through the contesting of elections where 
the contesting of such elections is deemed to advance our national objec-
tives’. However, Saoradh have not as yet contested elections and in fact in 
2016 the party asked the electorate to vote with their feet by staying at home 
and argued that voting in elections to the partitionist institutions conferred 
a legitimacy on Stormont that it does not possess.59 Dee Fennell has 
explained the Saoradh position on elections:
We have a position where we will fight elections where we believe it’s strate-
gically beneficial to the party and to the Republican struggle. People sometimes 
conflate electoralism and electoral mandate with legitimacy which I think is 
a fallacy. If you’re not elected it doesn’t mean that you don’t have legitimacy. It 
doesn’t mean you don’t have support. It can mean a multitude of things. It can 
mean you’re keeping your powder dry for another day.60
Fennell has also answered where the party takes its legitimacy from, if not 
from the polls:
It takes its legitimacy from the historical right of the Irish people to resist 
Britain’s occupation, to resist partition and to resist all the manifestations of 
either partition or occupation. So we derive our legitimacy ultimately from the 
will of the Irish people that has been expressed various times. I mean the vast 
majority of political parties in Ireland and the vast majority of people that vote 
in Ireland want to see a united Ireland in the first instance, so on that I think we 
are right. People might disagree with our methods.61
‘Dissident’/radical republicans argue that self-determination can only be 
exercised by the people of Ireland, in the 32 counties, acting as one unit. 
Saoradh and RSF point to the 1918 election as the last time when the 32 
counties of Ireland voted as a whole, where Sinn Féin won 73 out of 105 seats, 
resulting in the formation of the First Dáil. Radical republicans universally 
reject partition and the ‘partitionist’ institutions of Stormont and Leinster 
House62; and whilst the constitutions of RSF and Saoradh permit members to 
stand for election to either institution, it is on an abstentionist basis. The non- 
mainstream/radical republican narrative echoes the traditional republican 
position that legitimacy is not conferred through the electoral process. 
However, the fact that ‘dissident’/radical republican groups are not partaking 
in elections has ensured that they remain on the political fringes with 
arguably minimal impact.
The lack of public support for armed republicanism was a key criticism 
levelled at the groups in the aftermath of Lyra McKee’s killing. One month 
after the killing, Tommy McKearney described it as ‘a needless tragedy 
inflicted on a young woman by thoughtless stooges’ and wrote that:
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The Derry shooters have no water in which to swim. Whatever wider assess-
ments may be made of the Provisionals, it is undeniable that they received very 
considerable support from within the North’s nationalist community. By no 
stretch of the imagination can any similar claim be made today for tiny, isolated 
groups promoting armed conflict in the six counties. That fact alone condemns 
them to certain and total failure.63
RSF and Saoradh have argued that public support for them is deliberately 
understated. There is a belief among ‘dissident’ republicans that when an 
organisation aims to overthrow the system, that system will never accurately 
or adequately reflect the actual level of support which exists. An RSF spokes-
person in North Armagh has stated: ‘The difficulty that we have is at times 
people are afraid to publicly show that support but privately they will assist 
the Movement. They will help the Movement. They will take papers [Saoirse] 
from [Republican] Sinn Fein and we’ve [Republican] Sinn Féin activists on the 
ground on a day and daily basis engaging with people on their doorstep so 
we know that there is a significant level of support there’.64
It is difficult to gauge with any accuracy the support that ‘dissident’ armed 
organisations possess. However, it is reasonable to deduce that support is 
minimal, particularly in comparison to support commanded by Sinn Féin. 
Traditionally, survey data has understated the actual level of support for the 
IRA, failing to capture the ‘sneaking regarders’; levels of support that existed 
for the PIRA’s campaign remain contested today. As stated by Tonge ‘a 
mandate from the living has always eluded armed republicans and modern 
dissidents seek comfort in historical determinism’.65 Further, Horgan notes 
that ‘they (modern dissidents) claim not only to not need support but actively 
shun it, priding themselves on their pariah status’.66 Indicative of trends 
among social movements that challenge the status quo, ‘dissident’ repub-
lican groups often present their isolated status as further evidence that they 
‘are doing something right’.
Central to ‘dissident’ campaigns is the highlighting of prisoners, strip 
searching in the prisons, stop and searches, and republicans being held on 
remand (without charges) which they describe as internment. Anti-PSNI 
campaigns form a central element of the ‘dissident’ message and violent 
clashes between ‘dissident’ groups and the PSNI often take place at com-
memorations. When analysing the mechanisms that sustain ‘clandestine 
political violence’ Donatella Della Porta has identified ‘escalating policing’ 
as the first apparent mechanism and has stated that ‘repression created 
subcultures sympathetic to violence . . . In fact, repression produced transfor-
mative events’.67 In the context of ‘dissident’ republicanism Morrison has 
argued ‘it is this message of prisoner victimization which may prove to be 
the most powerful tool they have’.68
In August 2020 Saoradh prisoners (approximately 58) along with other 
republican prisoners started a two-week Hunger Strike in solidarity with 62- 
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year-old Palestinian Dr Issam Bassalat (also known as Issam Hijjawi) who was 
arrested along with nine Saoradh members as part of operation Arbacia.69 
After being outside the prison for medical treatment, upon return to 
Maghaberry, Dr Bassalat was held in isolation due to Covid restrictions, 
which Saoradh protested as a deliberate and malicious act.70 Hundreds of 
people partook in demonstrations in support of Dr Bassalat and the prisoners 
on Hunger Strike; which included a solidarity camp outside Maghaberry 
prison. When asked what the Hunger strike and demonstrations had achieved 
Dee Fennell stated that they reminded the state of how emotive prison 
struggle is for the wider republican base and that people took part in the 
protests ‘who may not necessarily agree with why a republican is in jail, with 
a campaign in which they might have taken part, or they are alleged to have 
taken part’.71 Fennell commented ‘It also demonstrated that the IRPWA72 and 
Saoradh have the potential still at this stage to mobilise large groups of 
people in Belfast and elsewhere, Derry, Lurgan, Strabane, Newry, Dublin, 
Cork, Kerry and other areas . . . and it sort of put the myth to bed that 
Saoradh or the IRPWA or the Republican Movement was in any way finished 
in those areas.’73
Saoradh will have taken comfort in the mobilisation of hundreds of people at 
the protests, regardless of whether or not they are Saoradh members or suppor-
ters. However, reflecting on the demonstrations, Tommy McKearney has argued:
Now you can talk about a rally on the Falls road and I tell you there wasn’t 
20,000 or 30,000 at it. There is more support than you would get maybe under 
other circumstances but that’s an extraordinary circumstance. In ‘78, before the 
first Hunger Strike began there was a parade from Coalisland to Dungannon 
focusing on prison conditions; there was 20,000 people who marched. There 
was 100,000 at Bobby Sands’ funeral.’74
For independent republicans, public support is not exclusively about man-
date and deriving legitimacy, it is also of practical significance to an armed 
campaign, as without support it will inevitably fail. Tommy McKearney, who 
was in the PIRA and was on the Blanket protest and 1980 Hunger strike, has 
argued: ‘Now the reason the Provisional IRA survived for 20 odd years in an 
armed campaign with one of the world’s great powers was because they had 
support. They had massive logistical support. Its people willing to provide 
houses, cars, to give intelligence, to support, to feed, to provide the man-
power, all that is what I’m talking about. That doesn’t exist at the moment so 
therefore launching any type of an armed campaign is actually propaganda 
by the deed’.75 In the Sinn Féin (and independent republican) analysis, 
popular support has to matter. Further, a war-weariness was evident in the 
1990s amongst the population in the North of Ireland, as noted by Bowyer- 
Bell, McKearney and Leahy. There was an evident glass ceiling on support for 
Sinn Féin whilst the PIRA campaign continued.76
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In an interview with the Irish News in 2014 Sinn Féin’s Sean (Spike) Murray 
suggested that ‘as the 1990s dawned war weariness on both sides meant 
some break in the cycle of violence was inevitable’.77 Amidst military stale-
mate and changing political dynamics (including the election of a Labour 
government in 1997) the leadership of the Provisional Movement saw 
another way forward. As noted by English ‘To republicans, the new circum-
stances offered challenge and opportunity’.78 Critics of ‘dissident’ groups 
argue that war-weariness amongst the population must be a consideration. 
Danny Morrison has also argued that support for the ceasefires existed within 
the republican base, stating ‘I know for a fact, because I was in jail, that 80 
plus per cent of the former prisoners support the change and what a minority 
are saying is you don’t have a right, you’re sell-out bastards’.79
The Sinn Féin/Provisional position is that the IRA cashed in the political 
chips of the campaign which had ended in stalemate; and maintains that it 
was leverage from the IRA campaign which brought about significant poli-
tical developments.80 By contrast, ‘dissident’ republican groups today do not 
possess significant strength which could be used as leverage to bargain with 
if they did declare a ceasefire. Interestingly, the Saoradh and RSF spokes-
persons putting forward an understanding of why the Continuity and New 
IRAs engage in armed activity are both in their 30s. The independents 
(McIntyre and McKearney) who are consigning armed actions to the past, 
and who fought in the PIRA campaign, are in their 60s. It may be the case that 
there is a generational influence; although this by no means is a neat char-
acterisation of the base in general, as age is not always indicative of views on 
armed struggle.
What campaign?
A narrative has emerged from independent republicans critiquing the cam-
paign waged by armed groups on the basis that 1) there is no prospect of 
success, 2) there is an absence of favourable conditions to sustain 
a campaign, including public support and 3) there isn’t a ‘campaign’. There 
has been a focus on the New IRA given the high level of activity from the 
organisation since January 2019 which included a car bomb outside the court 
house in Derry in January, parcel bombs sent to British Army personnel in 
England and Scotland in March and the killing of Lyra McKee in April. 
Commenting on New IRA activity McIntyre has asked ‘How could you support 
a campaign that’s waged on what often would seem nihilistic violence? They 
killed Lyra Mckee and in pursuit of what- isolated events? I mean, what right 
does those behind a campaign have to take the life of Lyra McKee when the 
campaign can achieve absolutely nothing?’81 McIntyre has argued ‘They are 
not a political social protest movement. They are a political cult; a political 
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cult grounded in what they say is the Irish tradition which many of them have 
abandoned anyway and shafted’.82
McIntyre has criticised current armed actions through a rights based 
framework stating ‘the central question that I would put to them is if the 
Irish people have the right to be free from British rule do they not have an 
equal right to be free from your violence to achieve the end of that road? 
Particularly given that your violence is so useless. It’s embarrassing that you 
would actually call this a war’.83 The absence of any notable campaign, 
beyond sporadic incidents, is a common criticism levelled at the armed 
groups. Within the republican base the issue has been raised that republicans 
are going to prison (on weapons or membership charges), often for activity 
that is not happening. Saoradh and RSF have rejected the argument that 
there isn’t a campaign and have argued that many incidents go unreported. 
Dee Fennell has argued ‘If republicanism isn’t a threat, if the IRA’s campaign 
isn’t viable, if Saoradh is futile, if republicanism is currently in a valley and not 
on a peak then why does the British government have to invest so much 
infrastructure, personnel, logistics, technology, so much money to combat it? 
I mean it was disclosed recently there’s over 700 MI5 operatives in Belfast 
alone’.84
A central consideration for armed republican groups is: what can be 
achieved by current sporadic actions? Anthony McIntyre has asked ‘If the 
big IRA couldn’t win the war against the British how’s a wee tiny ineffective 
IRA going to do anything?’85 McIntyre’s comment is reflective of mainstream 
criticism which asks why current armed groups feel they can succeed where 
the PIRA did not, even at the height of its campaign? When asked what the 
CIRA’s campaign to date has achieved an RSF spokesperson answered:
It has sent a clear message out to the world, to the British government that the 
Irish question isn’t settled and that it will not be settled any time soon and it will 
not be settled through Stormont and Leinster House. So it has put central focus 
on, that the Irish question cannot be settled by compromise, by entering 
Stormont or Leinster House. There will always be those that will engage in 
armed struggle.86
Saoradh, the New IRA, Republican Sinn Féin and the Continuity IRA continue 
to emphasise the right (which republicans possess) to engage in an armed 
campaign against occupation. The 1916 Easter Proclamation asserted the 
right of the Irish people to national freedom and sovereignty; and proclaimed 
the Irish Republic as a sovereign independent state. The Proclamation is 
universally cited by radical republicans, to assert the fundamental right to 
engage in armed struggle; however division exists over when that right 
should be exercised. Within the radical republican/‘dissident’ world, opposi-
tion to (or support for) current armed actions is inevitably influenced by views 
on why the PIRA campaign failed to achieve its ultimate objectives. Therein 
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lies part of the rational for a current campaign, which states that the methods 
did not fail but rather the leadership failed, or at worst was compromised.87 
Criticism of the Provisional leadership has formed a significant element of the 
radical republican message, along with the declaration that radical repub-
licans won’t ‘compromise’ or ‘sell-out’, therefore they will succeed where the 
PIRA failed.
A British military presence: they haven’t gone away
The killing of Lyra McKee in April 2019 took place against a backdrop of 
political instability caused by the continued suspension of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly since its collapse in 2017.88 Consequently, a mainstream 
narrative emerged which suggested that the ongoing suspension of 
Stormont had created a vacuum in which ‘dissident’ actions were thriving. 
However, armed ‘dissident’ organisations have proven more active during 
periods of political stability when Stormont is functioning; a point highlighted 
by Frampton in 2011 when he argued that the “vitality of dissident repub-
licanism has . . . not been determined by the waxing and waning of the 
institutions in Northern Ireland, so much as it has been circumscribed by an 
intra-republican dynamic’.89 For radical republicans who seek to challenge 
the status quo, the collapse of Stormont was simply presented as further 
evidence that Northern Ireland is a failed political entity.
Since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, normalisation and demilitarisa-
tion have been key features of the political landscape; and a key aim of the 
‘dissident’ republican campaign has been to disrupt the normalisation pro-
cess. Demilitarisation included the dismantling of a number of British Army 
barracks and the departure of British Army foot patrols in 2007, which saw the 
end of Operation Banner. Subsequently, in 2010 policing and justice were 
devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Despite this process of demilitar-
isation, the radical republican narrative has centred on the continuing British 
military presence and ‘continuing occupation’ in the North.90 Dee Fennell has 
stated:
Well I would say, looking in at armed republicanism, that British Army foot 
patrols haven’t went away. They’re maybe not in uniform and are not in 
armoured jeeps but British soldiers are on the streets in Belfast and Derry 
every day. Various regiments are stationed in Palace barracks and Thiepval 
and other barracks in the six counties. There’s thousands of them. It’s important 
to remember that its Britain that is at war with us, and by us I mean the Irish 
people, through their military installations, through their personnel, through 
their activities and if the British presence was removed from Ireland, armed 
republicans wouldn’t have a British presence to fight with.91
The ongoing presence of British soldiers has been presented by the New and 
Continuity IRAs as justification for continuing their campaign; and British 
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soldiers are viewed as a ‘key target’, as well as the PSNI who they argue are 
the first line of defence of the British in Ireland. As noted by Whiting, the 
character of armed republicanism is ‘sporadic and infrequent yet precise and 
calculated in its targets’.92 Whilst armed ‘dissident’ groups recognise that 
their campaign isn’t likely to achieve a united Ireland in the near future, they 
seek to prevent the normalisation of policing and to demonstrate their 
capability to launch an attack. They aim to prevent the PSNI and prison 
staff from feeling secure in their roles and they strive to provide a constant 
reminder that the PSNI are not operating in a normal society.
When asked who armed republicans are at war with, Fennell has answered: 
‘From the outside looking in at armed republicans it’s quite clear who they are 
at war with. I mean they are not at war with civilians. Republicans have never 
been at war with civilians. So, it’s clear to me if you look at the reports of who 
they’ve targeted since 2012 and previous to that – It’s been British soldiers, 
members of the British police in Ireland and prison officers’.93 Fennell’s 
comment echoes that of a CIRA spokesperson in North Armagh in 2014 
who described ‘legitimate targets’ as ‘Police, British soldiers, prison warders. 
Commercial targets. In some circumstances British Ministers. But security 
forces would be the main target’.94 McIntyre has commented on the targeting 
of PSNI:
Well, you see I have a problem with that because they are driving around on 
bikes. They’re not a key target. They are a key imaginary target. You’ve 
people going to jail for stuff that will never happen so if the police are 
a key target they’re not getting targeted. Even when the police are a key 
target it shows you how it has become normalised anyway. I mean the New 
IRA is never going to be able to mount the type of campaign to bring the 
British Army back onto the streets. The cops are treating them with con-
tempt, just calling them criminals. Everybody just shrugs their shoulders. 
Houses are being raided and people walk on by and will say well you brought 
it on yourself.95
Questions have arisen around the morality of a sporadic campaign which is 
unlikely to achieve its ultimate objective of Irish unity; and whose key aim 
appears to be the disruption of normalisation. When asked about the 
morality of occasional attacks, a spokesperson for the RSF Movement in 
North Armagh stated: ‘Yes armed action is morally sound. As we have said 
before there have been occasions where in the past we have seen that 
there’s been lulls in it but we don’t count our morality on a body count, 
that’s not how we count our morality. Whether there’s hundreds being 
killed or if one soldier is being killed its morally justified from the 
Republican perspective’.96 When asked if the armed campaign is working 
to achieve Irish unity Dee Fennell answered:
Well nothing else has worked. So I’m not saying it’s morally right. I’m not saying 
it’s effective. I’m not saying it’s going to work because if you say any of those 
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things you could end up on charges. But what I will say is what else has 
achieved Irish unity? They’re basically all sitting and waiting on a sectarian 
headcount . . . I think it’s a question that can be asked of every political party 
of a nationalist republican persuasion right across Ireland- is what you’re doing 
achieving Irish unity? And I don’t think any of them could give a positive 
answer’.97
The RSF spokesperson from North Armagh, who was sentenced to nine years 
for possession of explosives in the 2000s, and went on to serve a sentence in 
Maghaberry prison, has stated ‘The bottom line is whilst there is British 
political and military interference in Ireland there will always be those that 
will oppose it. We’ve seen time after time unfortunately when the Movement 
has been in the position to show the Brits what they were – it’s been our own 
republican leaders that have let us down. There’s been treachery after treach-
ery and luckily enough for us there’s those that’s been willing to stay the 
course and fight for what’s right’.98
Operation Arbacia and the infiltration of republicanism
Despite the outpouring of condemnation locally, nationally and internation-
ally over the killing of Lyra McKee, an examination of the wider ‘dissident’/ 
radical republican base concludes that the killing was not a defining moment 
in terms of individuals or organisations altering their positions on armed 
actions at present. When asked if Lyra McKee’s killing by the New IRA had 
changed anything for Saoradh Dee Fennell stated:
I think it’s important to point out that Lyra McKee’s death was wrong and 
shouldn’t have happened. To answer your question, and it sounds harsh, but 
no it didn’t change Saoradh’s strategy. We didn’t lose a single member over it. 
Our recruitment levels have went up and I think that was because the repub-
lican base were able to differentiate between who was responsible and who 
wasn’t. Saoradh played no part in Lyra McKee’s death or the aftermath.99
For those already opposed to current armed actions, the killing emphasised 
the futility of the current campaign, as demonstrated by Tommy McKearney: 
‘It underlined the absolute dead end that that was in. It’s an accident that was 
waiting to happen’.100 Whilst neither side of the divide has altered their 
position, the killing has entrenched the line between those who continue 
to advocate armed actions and those who are opposed. For independents 
like McKearney the question of armed struggle has been settled, the cam-
paign is over. The more relevant question is ‘Having broken the old Orange 
state and replaced it with an administration that not only includes members 
of the Catholic population but also former senior members of the IRA, the 
question must now be asked whether republicanism has reached the limit of 
its radical potential in Ireland’.101
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What has proven more of a defining moment for ‘dissident’ armed repub-
licanism was Operation Arbacia in August 2020 when nine members of 
Saoradh and Palestinian Dr Issam Hijjawi-Bassalat were arrested as part of 
an operation directed against the New IRA. The operation used an alleged 
MI5 agent who had infiltrated the organisation. Historically, the use of infor-
mers and agents by the security services, to infiltrate republican organisa-
tions, has been widespread and has impacted the ability of those 
organisations to function and recruit. The extent to which infiltration 
impacted the PIRA’s ability to operate and continue its campaign remains 
contested.102
The Provisional Movement has rejected any suggestion that it was 
defeated, or that it could not continue with its campaign; rather it has 
emphasised that a military stalemate was reached. However, debate con-
tinues around the impact of informers on the Republican Movement as 
illustrated by Hopkins: ‘The extent to which the use of informers contributed 
to the strategic containment of the republican movement, if not the defeat of 
the IRA campaign as such, has become a key component of the post-conflict 
contestation within what might be broadly understood as the ‘republican 
family’.103 Revelations of agents operating at a senior level within Sinn Féin, 
such as Denis Donaldson,104 have fuelled suspicions regarding policy and 
strategy.105 However, Leahy has argued that infiltration actually had a limited 
impact on PIRA operations due to the elusive nature of many rural units, the 
cell structure of the organisation and the isolation of the IRA leadership from 
the rest of the Movement,106 points that are often understated in the pre-
vailing narrative on the effectiveness of informers.107 Leahy has also rejected 
the argument that ‘agents of influence’ within Sinn Féin, such as Donaldson, 
had a significant impact on the Movement’s decision to end its campaign and 
has stated ‘Donaldson and other Sinn Féin informers seem to have had 
extremely limited access to the IRA’.108 Significantly, for independents such 
as McIntyre and McKearney, the fact that the PIRA and Sinn Féin was infil-
trated (possibly with ‘agents of influence’) does not impact their belief that 
the ending of the PIRA campaign in the 1990s was correct.
Undoubtedly, the exposure of numerous informers and agents within the 
PIRA had an impact beyond the operational level. Revelations of infiltration 
had an impact on organisational morale, contributing to an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust, which has carried over into the ‘dissident’ groups. 
Whilst historically republicanism has remained ever vigilant of the threat of 
infiltration, the so-called ‘dissident’ world appears to be preoccupied with the 
threat to an unprecedented level, where the label of agent or informer is 
readily applied as ‘dissident’ groups are fiercely determined to not fall victim 
to infiltration which seeks to disrupt military operations and steer the political 
direction of the Movement; something they believe happened in the past 
with the PIRA. The relevant question regarding the ‘dissident’ armed groups 
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becomes- to what extent is this mind-set provoking inertia regarding their 
activities and strategy?
Brexit: a shot in the arm for republicanism
Brexit-related instability has put a renewed focus on the border in Ireland and 
subsequently on the campaign waged by armed republican groups, amidst 
speculation over where border checks will take place. Whilst there is no 
consensus around the extent of the threat posed by ‘dissident’ groups 
there is general acknowledgment that Brexit has proven a destabilising 
force on the political landscape, the consequences of which have still to be 
felt.109 The peace process, and the political process underpinning it, have 
been predicated on the principle of consent and parity of esteem, with 
emphasis drawn away from the physical border. Brexit has catapulted the 
issue of the border back into mainstream debate and has altered the relation-
ship between the UK and Ireland, ushering in a new political environment 
which is significantly different from the one in which the Good Friday 
Agreement was conceived.110 Indeed, for many, Brexit has reawakened the 
constitutional question and ‘has raised the prospect of a united Ireland in its 
most serious form in decades’.111
Radical republicans have been keen to emphasise that Brexit doesn’t 
actually alter anything for traditional republicanism which is opposed to 
any border in Ireland regardless of what form it takes, as stated by an RSF 
spokesperson in North Armagh: ‘It doesn’t matter whether it’s a soft border, 
a hard border, it’s still the British imposed border there’.112 However, repub-
licans will always seize upon any opportunity to advance their political 
agenda and Brexit is seen as a significant opportunity to be exploited.113 
Dee Fennell has criticised, what he sees as, Sinn Féin’s failure to capitalise on 
the opportunity presented by Brexit:
It provides opportunities for republicans and the big question should be- like 
I don’t know why more journalists and academics aren’t asking- if Brexit brings 
a United Ireland closer why did Sinn Fein campaign against it? They could have 
said listen we’ll support Ireland being in the EU but we want you to tactically 
vote for Brexit in the six counties so that it can bring reunification closer.114
Sinn Féin and independent ‘dissident’/radical republicans (such as McIntyre 
and McKearney) offer a similar criticism of the campaign waged by the 
Continuity and New IRAs, emphasising the lack of support amongst a war- 
weary population and the inability to achieve success. It is this similarity in 
position towards the armed struggle that causes members of the ‘dissident’ 
groups to accuse critics of the campaign as ‘sell-outs’ or to accusingly state 
that they are going down the same path as the Provisional Movement. In 
March 2021 RSF Ard Chomhairle member, and former President, Des 
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Dalton115 resigned from the organisation after being suspended for com-
ments he made (in a personal capacity) during an interview for Liverpool 
University’s Civic space project stating that conditions at present are not right 
for an armed campaign.
In an article in The Observer about the interview, Dalton argued that ‘the 
suspension of “armed struggle” will create better conditions for all Ireland 
dialogue about reunification to take place in the post-Brexit era’.116 The 
RSF Ard Chomhairle called an emergency online meeting at which Dalton 
was suspended for the comments – after which he resigned from the 
organisation. Within weeks, the RSF Movement had reaffirmed its support 
for continuing armed actions in its Easter Statement: ‘In every decade 
armed struggle has been used, not as a principle, not as a tactic, but as 
a reality of opposition to British Crown Forces. When a sustained campaign 
cannot be mounted, it is a duty to at least harass the enemy’.117 Similarly, 
the New IRA’s Easter statement reaffirmed its commitment to continuing 
armed actions.
Conclusion
The altered political landscape in the North of Ireland since 1998 has removed 
much of the impetus behind an armed campaign. As this article has sought to 
show, political and ideological debate on the use of armed action has 
continued within radical republicanism in Ireland. Much of this debate has 
centred on traditional republican ideas and conceptions in a changing poli-
tical context, taking note of the emergence of Brexit with all its implications 
for the long-term viability of the Northern Irish state. There are two IRA 
groupings actively operating in Ireland – the New IRA and the Continuity 
IRA. Beyond these, there are other ‘dissident’/radical republican organisa-
tions, as well as independents; and it appears unlikely that the base will 
unite under any unified structure. The enduring fragmentation has resulted 
in the absence of a unified leadership or message, and no collective strength 
is drawn from the base.
Many of the first recruits to the PIRA joined after the burning of Bombay 
Street in 1969, the Falls Curfew in 1970, internment in 1971, the Ballymurphy 
Massacre in 1971, Bloody Sunday in 1972; followed later by the Hunger Strikes 
in 1980 and 1981, as well as in response to aggressive house raids and British 
military and police activity directed at the nationalist and republican popula-
tion. As Leahy has pointed out, British military operations served, on occasion, 
as a catalyst for this recruitment: ‘Alongside major security force operations 
that proved controversial such as Bloody Sunday, certain intelligence opera-
tions such as the “shoot-to-kill” incidents appeared to sustain rather than 
contain or degrade IRA activity’.118 McKearney concluded that the 
Provisional’s demand for an end to British rule and partition, was as much 
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a demand for the end of misrule and the denial of rights, as a traditional 
aspiration for Irish unity, commenting: ‘When the Provisional IRA insisted in 
the post-Bloody Sunday period that only an end to British rule would satisfy 
its members, it was at least as much a condemnation of London mismanage-
ment as an expression of the desire for self-determination'.119
Since 1998 there has not been another Bloody Sunday or Ballymurphy 
Massacre and for most of the population internment has been relegated to 
the past. Independent ‘dissident’ republicans (former members of Sinn Fein 
or the PIRA) are critical of armed actions waged by the Continuity and 
New IRAs – arguing that conditions today do not justify a campaign. 
Independents disagree with the politics behind the peace process and 
the direction in which Sinn Fein has moved in the years since; however, 
they agree with Sinn Féin and the Provisional Movement that it was 
correct to end the PIRA campaign in the 1990s given general war- 
weariness.
Gerry Bradley, a North Belfast republican who operated in the PIRA for 
23 years, stated in his memoir Insider that he agreed with ending the PIRA 
campaign; however, he criticised the PIRA leadership for the way in which it 
ended. He accused the leadership of deliberately winding the campaign 
down, a criticism also commonly levelled from ‘dissident’ republicans- 
which is strongly denied by the Provisional Movement. Bradley was simulta-
neously critical of the armed campaign waged by ‘dissident’ groups. 
Bradley,120 McIntyre and McKearney are representative of a constituency 
within republicanism which feels that the Provisional leadership settled for 
less than it should have, but that ending the campaign was correct.
By contrast, the ‘dissident’/radical republican groups – namely, Republican 
Sinn Féin (RSF), the Continuity IRA, Saoradh, and the New IRA – continue to 
argue that the IRA campaign was fought for sovereignty, and nothing less, 
and therefore altered conditions within Northern Ireland do not affect the 
campaign or the justification behind it. They also argue that internment by 
remand continues today. A significant portion of the message from RSF and 
Saoradh highlights current republican prisoners and police activity against 
their members or supporters, such as stop and searches, house raids, or 
arrests. However, their message has not gained significant traction amongst 
the wider nationalist/republican population, North or South. Support for the 
groups remains minimal in comparison to the strong electoral mandate 
possessed by Sinn Féin; although ‘dissident’ republican groups do not take 
legitimacy from popular support, nor do they seek an electoral mandate. 
Rather, their mandate comes from the continuing ‘occupation’ and partition 
of Ireland.
The location of current armed actions (by the Continuity and the New 
IRA) as the latest phase in one long republican campaign remains contested 
within the wider radical republican base. Debates continue around the 
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futility of sporadic actions, the capability to wage a campaign, the impor-
tance of popular support and the morality of occasional attacks which aim 
to ‘keep the flame burning’, disrupt normalisation and demonstrate 
capability.121 Those continuing to advocate armed actions (or more com-
monly say that they understand the motivations behind them)122 remain 
wedded to the old mantra that as long as there is a British presence in 
Ireland there will be those willing to resist it in arms. As Horgan has stated ‘it 
is about people for whom there will never be a peace process, never 
a negotiated settlement, and who will never be satisfied by politics or 
appeased by mainstream opinion’.123
Sinn Féin’s condemnation of the campaign waged by the ‘dissident’ 
groups has been unequivocal. Most notably in 2009, after the killing of two 
British soldiers by the RIRA, and two days later the killing of PSNI Constable 
Stephen Carroll by the CIRA, Martin McGuinness stood outside Stormont 
alongside then Chief Constable Hugh Orde and First Minister Peter 
Robinson and denounced those responsible for the killing as ‘traitors to the 
island of Ireland’. McGuinness’s remarks provoked a strong response from the 
32CSM who argued ‘the British Strategy has now reached its pinnacle with 
a Provisional Sinn Féin leader standing at Stormont, under the British flag, as 
a minister of the British crown, calling IRA volunteers “traitors” for continuing 
to resist British occupation’.124 The bitter divide between the Provisional and 
‘dissident’ worlds further entrenched as each condemned the path taken by 
the other as treacherous. ‘Dissident’ republicans have frequently quoted 
Martin McGuinness’s 1982 BBC interview when he said, ‘We don’t believe 
that winning elections and winning any amount of votes will bring freedom 
in to Ireland. At the end of the day, it will be the cutting edge of the IRA which 
will bring freedom’.125
The Provisional leadership continues to navigate its way through main-
taining a connection to its past whilst emphasising a definitive departure 
from armed struggle. The provisional and ‘dissident’ worlds are engaged in 
a battle over memory and ownership of the past as each seeks to empha-
sise continuity and to deny the other legitimacy. Commemorations play an 
important role in both the Provisional and ‘dissident’ worlds in emphasis-
ing connection with the past, as ‘fallen comrades’ are remembered. As 
noted by Hopkins ‘in the sphere of revolutionary political and ideological 
movements, nostalgia could more accurately be characterised by its poten-
tial to be used as a weapon of struggle.’126 Sinn Féin continues to hold 
commemorations for fallen IRA volunteers and highlights the legitimacy of 
the PIRA campaign in contrast to the illegitimacy of the ‘dissident’ 
campaign.
Seamus Mallon, former Deputy first Minister127 of Northern Ireland and 
Deputy Leader of the SDLP, described the Good Friday Agreement as 
Sunningdale for slow learners, arguing that what was achieved could 
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have been realised in the early 1970s without the PIRA’s thirty-year cam-
paign. Sinn Féin reject this narrative and point to key differences, including 
the Patten report which changed the RUC to the PSNI. Similar to Mallon’s 
analysis ‘dissident’ republicans argue that yes, we could have had what the 
Provisional leadership ‘settled for’ many years previously and without an 
armed campaign; however, the thrust of the ‘dissident’ argument is that 
the fault lies with the Provisional leadership who, in their opinion, ‘settled’ 
for too little in return for ending the armed campaign. In this respect, 
those wedded to armed republican methods argue that the campaign did 
not fail, rather the leadership failed. White has stated ‘From the perspec-
tive of those who left the Provisionals for rival organizations, the war is not 
over. The Provisionals did not win and anything they might have gained 
does not make up for what was lost through their betrayal’.128
As the low-level campaigns of the Continuity and New IRAs continue, for 
many, attention is only drawn to these groups when the media highlights an 
incident. The issue of republican armed struggle has been largely relegated to 
the past. Despite this, in 2018, in his first press conference as the new 
Commissioner of An Garda Síochána (the Police Service of the Republic of 
Ireland), Drew Harris stated that ‘dissident’ republicanism remains ‘the big-
gest threat on the island of Ireland’.129 Further, in its October 2020 report to 
the House of Commons, the Intelligence and Security Committee of 
Parliament stated ‘the number of attacks in 2019 demonstrates that the 
main DR groups are resilient, and retain both the intent and capability to 
cause serious damage’.130
British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was once asked by a young 
reporter what the most troubling problem during his Prime Ministership 
was, to which he famously replied ‘events, dear boy, events.’ The message 
conveyed is clear, that the political landscape can be dramatically and 
rapidly transformed by unforeseen events. It is arguable that those advo-
cating militant republicanism are being overtaken by wider events, cour-
tesy of Brexit via demographic change in the North of Ireland. A border 
poll on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland is now viewed as 
a real possibility in the medium term. In the context of Brexit and calls for 
a second Scottish independence referendum, there is a sense that the 
constitutional sands may be shifting. Regarding a referendum on Irish 
unity, Brendan O’Leary has commented, ‘This prospect is arriving faster 
than most expected’ and ‘Not to prepare is to take the ostrich as the 
paragon of political virtue’.131 The general nationalist population in the 
North of Ireland, for whom militant ‘dissident’ republicanism was already 
a minority taste, is likely to ask what place a low-level sporadic campaign, 
without a clear strategy, could possibly have within the contemporary 
context and these new realities.
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Appendix A.
Table 1. ‘Dissident’ armed actions resulting in fatalities or serious injury 1998-2016
Year Armed Activity Organisation responsible
1998 Omagh Bombing which killed 29 people Real IRA
2009 British Soldiers Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar shot 
dead outside Massereene Barracks in Antrim
Real IRA
2009 PSNI Constable Stephen Carroll shot dead in Craigavon Continuity IRA
2010 PSNI Officer Peadar Heffron seriously injured in 
a bomb attack under his car near Randalstown 
whilst on his way to work in Belfast
ONH
2011 PSNI Officer Ronan Kerr killed by a car bomb in 
Omagh, County Tyrone
Believed to be a faction of the RIRA, 
who later went into the New IRA.
2012 Prison Officer David Black shot dead whilst on his way 
to work in Maghaberry prison
New IRA
2013 Kevin Kearney shot dead in North Belfast for alleged 
drug-dealing
New IRA
2016 Prison Officer Adrian Ismay died of a heart attack 
following a bomb attack under his van in East 
Belfast
New IRA
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